E.T.A.'s truce

This file is a mirror of EUSKAL HERRIA JOURNAL by Basque Red Net.

The Ardanza Plan

Note: This is the Basque Nationalist Party's proposal for the "pacification" of the Basque Country. The plan, which was drafter by the former president of three Basque provinces (from a total of seven) Jose Antonio Ardanza, rejects self-determination as the root of the conflict in the Basque Country, and excludes the province of Navarre from the negotiating table. The plan is about negotiations among the political parties with representation in the Bascongada parliament aiming at a "resolution" to be accepted by Madrid as "the decision of the Basque people."

Following is the official translation provided by Spain's government of Bascongadas (aka "Basque Autonomous Community" and "Euskadi")

Proposal of the Lehendakari to the parties of the Mesa de Ajuria Enea for the "dialogue-based solution ": Peace Proposal.

On 16 January 1998 the Lehendakari José Antonio Ardanza presented to the democratic political parties of the Basque Country his "peace proposal", a methodological proposal which could serve as a democratic basis for a process of dialogue to resolve the problem of violence in the Basque Country. The text proposed by the President of the Basque Government established certain premises - the first of these involved the requirement that ETA cease the use of violence - which would permit the development of a process of dialogue in which all the Basque political forces with parliamentary representation could participate, without being subject to prior demands, conditions or limits.

The proposal, which has received a broad backing from the body of the Basque people and among the majority of their social and political representatives, could not, however, be approved. The opposition of the Spanish Government and the refusal of the Partido Popular in the Basque Country to discuss it blocked its acceptance as a working document for the democratic parties.

The premises

1 . Thus, referring to the world of ETA-HB and trying to carry out an exercise of political realism, it is reasonable to envisage the following :

a) ETA is not going to renounce its "armed strugglefight" as a result of a police defeat by the police. This is, at least, what we all sayeveryone says, including the Ministry of the Interior. More than thirty years of "anti-terrorist fight", during the dictatorship and as a democracyfrom standpoints both dictatorial and democratic, seem to support this point. It is not, then, reasonable to think, on our part, of a police victory.

b) Neither is it reasonable to envisage that ETA will renounce the "armed strugglefight" nor that HB is going to be incorporated into the political activity proper to the democratic system by reason of a kind of "conversion", forced or spontaneous, to the virtues of the current system. For much as we would like this to be so or we consider it a requisite from the ethical and democratic point of view, it is not reasonable to think that they are going to abandon what they see as "thirty years of strugglefight and suffering" in exchange for nothing or, to putsay it more explicitly, in exchange for the constitutional and statutory status quo represented by the constitution and Statute of autonomy. They fear that such a "conversion" would be interpreted, by their own people and others, as a total surrender.

In this sense, if a "defeat by the police" the "police defeat" is discounted, neither is it foreseeable - much as it may hurt though it hurts us to accept it - that there will be a "political defeat" as crude and brutal as is expressed here. It is not, then, reasonable to envisage that there will be a kind of collective "desisting" by those involvedin this world.

The Comparisons with what occurred with the "poli-milis" do not seem appropriatedoes not seem right in this respect. What they did, taking advantage of the transition to democracy and self-government, does not seem repeatable in a situation of a settled democracy (and one afflicted, according to them, with notable accumulated defects).

Thus, then, the renunciation by ETA of the "armed strugglefight" and the incorporation of HB into the current constitutional and statutory and Statute-based system cannot be seen as coming about "without more ado", that is to say, as a result of a kind of "conversion" or "desisting", be it spontaneous or forced by circumstances (police efficiency, legal action, political isolation, social pressure, etc.).

c) This being so - neither "police defeat by the police" nor "political defeat" in terms of "desisting"-, the abandonment of what ETA considers its "armed strugglefight" and the incorporation of HB into the democratic political activity will require, from their point of view, something that they can interpret as a political incentive which justifies their actionthem in front of to their own people. As far as we know, it seems that this incentive can only be a dialogue - even if they call it "negotiation" and we call it the "dialogue-based solution" - which would be likelysusceptible, at least in principle, to haveof an effective impact on the current constitutional and Statute-basedstatutory system.

At the moment the boldest statement this would be the most daring confirmation which we cancould make in common is: a dialogue-based solutionan outcome through dialogue which would be likelysusceptible, in principleal, to have an impactof impacting on the current legal and- political system, would seem to be the minimum requirement which ETA and HB would make in exchange for agreeingaccept to abandon violence (ETA) and be incorporated into the democratic system (HB).

2. On the other hand, viewing the process from the perspective of the democratic pParties, we should at this point know at leastmust know at this level, at least, the following :

a) No democratic government is going to set up a political dialogue (to solve the problem) with an operational "terrorist" organisationorganization. It is not only a question of democratic legitimacy, it deals with an actual impossibility. No government could survivesupport it. The need, therefore, forof a "cessation of hostilities" on the part of ETA, before any political dialogue (for resolution), is absolute.

b) Neither is it reasonable to envisage anythat the "outcome through dialogue" (the resolutory political dialogue aimed at finding a solution) between can have as protagonists a democratic government and a terrorist organisationorganization, even when this latter is in a situation of "cease-fire". At this pointthese levels we have to exclude, for many reasons (of legitimacy and actual viability), the staging of such bilateral talksbilateralism. If, as was said above, the political weightcontent of the final dialogue is for them one of the essential requisites (see 1.c.), those who must support it must necessarily be legitimate political agents. We cannot, therefore, contemplate as viable the hypothesis of a political and resolutiveresolutory dialogue ("negotiation" or "outcome through dialogue") between the gGovernment and ETA.

c) The final political dialogue (solutionresolutory) cannot involve wiping clean the slate as regards assume either, on the one side, making a tabula rasa of what the democratic system has built up so farbeen constructing up to today (Constitution, Statute, institutions of self-government). Neither can it nor, on the other hand, consider the process closed at the limits of what has been constructed up till now. Both the one and the other would be equivalent to obliging one or the other interlocutor to be untrue to himself and his own reason for being (I am not speaking of the "raison d'être" of "terrorism", because there is nonewhich has none, but of the raison d'être of what underlies it: the civil-political dissidence of a considerablenotable portion of society which, moving around the "terrorists""terrorism", is not prepared to accept the status quo). The resolutiveresolutory political dialogue may neither, therefore, a) accept prior conditions which deny the raison d'être of one of the interlocutors (prior recognition, for example, of the right of self-determination), nor b) set fixed limits beforehand which deny the raison d'être of the other (the Constitution or Statute as impassable limits).

In a nutshell, tThese are, more or less set out, the premises. They do not contain - or at least do not seek to contain - value judgements and they try to avoid any type of wilfulness. They are, in short, come, in total, dictated by reality and by the experience which we have accumulated overthroughout the years. Our task now consists in preparing, on this basisfrom these and, ensuring that we are honest with ourselveswithout making traps for ourselves, an overall global strategy which, in addition to being legitimate from the democratic point of view, looks likely, at least initially, to be viablehas aspects, at least a priori, of viability. It is not enough to accept a dialogue based solution in theory, in theory, the outcome through dialogue. The responsibility of those who have to resolve the problem liesconsists in defining, first, what this dialogue would consist of and secondly in providingto provide, then, the conditions which make it possible, that is to say, in designingto design, first, athe final outcomehorizon which would be acceptable to us and then conductingto conduct the progress towards this and no other outcome.horizon (and not towards another).

We must It is fitting to avoid now, and henceforth, avoid anya possible misunderstanding. What is proposed here is not based ondoes not start from the existence of any supposed "lack of democracydemocratic defect" inwhich our system might suffer and , which would have to be putthe obligation of right in order to overcome the violence. It is based only drawn from on a fact: the profound political and social division which exists in the Basque society; and pursues a single objective: to reach a greater political integration and social reconciliation. We do not ask ourselves, therefore, what democracy must do to correct its supposed deficiencies, but what it wants to and can do to overcome the lack of integration which the Basque society actually suffers from in fact. The democratic legitimacy of the system is not in question.

This is what I have been referring to from the beginning in speaking of our responsibility to design an "overallglobal strategy of pacification". The police and legal measures (the application of the law) are necessary. At the same time, so are other measures, such as social pressure, political discourse, etc. But these must be included within a larger context, within which is also included this design of the "dialogue-based solutionoutcome through dialogue". In addition to pressure (democratic firmness and unity), it is essential to show a way out (democratic dialogue).

In order to contribute to this design, the lack absence of which among us ourselves is perhaps the most clamorous failure of this Discussion GroupTable since it defined its mainthe great principles in January 1988, the following lines of reflection could be put forward.

The Proposal

1. Terms on which Dialogue is Possible.Conditions of possibility of dialogue.

a) Before anything else, ETA will have to acceptinternalise that it has to cease to exercise the "armed strugglefight" ("terrorism") so that a productive political dialogue cancould be started. Our discourse with respect to this has to be unanimousunequivocal and sustained. There can be no resolutiveresolutory political dialogue while ETA remainsmaintains operational status.

b) For how longmuch time must ETA desist from the "armed strugglefight" ("terrorism") in order to make credible before it can be considered unequivocally toits unequivocal wish for an end toof finishing with the violent conflict? This, is a difficult question to answer. It seems reasonable to think that, at this stage of the process, an "indefinite cease-fire unlimited in time" would be required, with the undertaking on the other side of a pre-setprefixed beginning and end to the period of political dialogue.

c) In order to commenceproceed to this cease-fire, ETA would want to know beforehand what is the dialogue which we propose to conduct. It seems essential to let them know thisTo make this known would seem essential. The lack of this knowledge on the part of ETA or, to put it another waywhich is the same, our lack of definition in this respect is what (naturally, among other evident reasons) has meant that, up till now and with the possible exception of January 1989, all the truces launched by ETA have had a merely tactical intention. Now it would be a question that ETA must not be allowed would not be able to manage the truces at its pleasure, but mustwould announce and maintain them in response to a specific offer of pacification. We cannot be at the mercy of the ETA truces, but ETA must place its put the truce at the mercy of the peace.

d) In addition to ETA, public opinion also must also be made aware of the general framework of the possibleeventual dialogue. In an open and democratic society it would be neither possible nor legitimateimpossible, as well as illegal, to take away from society a matter of this scope out of the hands of society itself, at least in its essential features. Again, the involvementimplication of public opinion would be right and proper, although its capacity to neutraliseneutralize political initiatives is enormous. The process needs, therefore, the complicity of to have public opinion on its side. It must be an understandable, assumable andresponsible and plausible process for democratic public opinion.

2. The Interlocutors.

a) ETA must admit that, as an with regard to its organisationorganization, it cannot itself be anthe interlocutor in this resolutiveresolutory political dialogue. Neither the interlocutors of the other side nor public opinion would stand for it. It is a question of pragmatism (and of legitimacylegality). The interlocutors must be legitimisedlegitimized by the fact that they represent a sector of the peopletheir popular representation. HB must, therefore, assume directly the spokesmanship directly. AnyThe bilateral Government-ETA talksposition in a resolutiveresolutory political dialogue ("negotiation" or "dialogue-based solutionoutcome through dialogue") has to be excluded beforehand. In this, the attitude of the pParties must be unanimousunequivocal and sustained. It is the most efficient manner of convincing ETA of the uselessness of its determination to continuein continuing with violence. The violence of ETA is out of placeexcessive and obstructive in this process. ETA has to understand that and accept it. The dialogue, should it take place, will not be a consequence of the violence but of its ceasing.

b) The interlocutors must therefore be, solely and exclusively, the representative pParties. To put it more forcefully, the leading role must lieEven more. The protagonism must fall, in the first instance, withon the representative pParties representingof Basque society. The problem is, before all and above all, a Basque problem, although it consists in the problematic and contradictory interpretation which we the Basques people make of a matter which also concerns other people: the national question of nationhood. It is we who, in principle, have to reach an agreementarrive at an arrangement.

It must be accepted, therefore, that the nub of the problems is not in a supposed confrontation between Spain and the, State -Basque Country, in which ETA occupies the role of "front linevanguard" representative of the authentic popular Basque will of the Basque people, but that it consists in the conflicting opinions of Basquescounterposition of Basque opinions over what we are and what we want to be (also in relation to Spain, of coursecertainly).

c) This said, it will also have to be accepted that the dialogue which takes place between the pParties representing the Basquesof Basque representation concerns the whole of SpainState. To that extentIn such measure that the bodies representing Spainthe State will have to take parthave a participation in the process.

It should be said, in the first place, that such participation is already guaranteed, in principle, through the Basque representation in the Basque Country of the pParties working throughout Spain in the ambit of the State, which would ensure that the sufficient consensus which would have to be reached among the Basque pParties cwould also beable to be assumed throughout Spainin the State ambit.

Moreover, More still. Tthe process which is proposed has to be seencontemplated from an eminently pragmatic perspective. Questions of profound political and ideological matters, such as those of "sovereignty" and where it liesits "residence" (whether in the Spanish people or in the Basques) must be obviatedremain at a remove. Here we are dealing with a preliminaryprior procedural phase: how to resolve a conflict which arises from a specific group. In the course of the process, neither sovereignty nor its residence will be brought into the discussionin question. Instead, Rather, from the sovereignty currently recognized, a certain procedure for resolution is being chosen from the standpoint of sovereignty as it is now recognised.

From this perspective, the competent Spanish bodiesagencies of the State, as a party involved in the part concerned in the process, choose to - and declare beforehand their willingnessdisposition to - 1) leave the resolution through dialogue of the conflict in the hands of the pParties representingrepresentative of Basque society, 2) accepttake on the agreements achieved by those pParties in the Basque institutions and 3) agree with them on their possibleeventual incorporation into the legal mandamusregulations so that they can become operative.

3. The Contents of the Dialogue. The resolutiveresolutory political dialogue will clearly revolve, as is clear, around the so-called "national question of nationhood", that is to say, around the model of self-government which we Basques would like to set uphave. Starting from the status quo presentlyactually existing and the acceptance, at least on a de facto basisin actuality, of the current institutions of self-government - the democratic legitimacy of which is unquestionable for us - an agenda would be negotiated, a procedure agreed and eventually a consensus would possibly be reached (the levels of which , in order to be sufficient, would have to be fixed beforehand for them to be considered as sufficient). All the parties would undertake beforehand to respect them and ETA, in particular, would have to make clear, from the beginning, that it would neither interfere in the process nor return to its violent activity if the results did not satisfy it. The commitment to undertaking with the democratic procedures has to be unequivocal and definitive from before the process is begun.

The extent of the period of dialogue and negotiation would have to be fixed beforehand. On the other hand, the process would have to be, as has been said, open-ended at both ends: a) without prior conditions and b) without limit as to results. To take an example: the recognition of self-determination could neither be neither made a prior condition for beginning the process, nor could it be excluded a priori as a possiblen eventual result of the consensus. Because, should it be the result of the consensus, it could cease to be an element of internal and external confrontation, and become an instrument of reconciliation.

Agreements having been reached could be staggered , series of stages in time could be considered in order to make them effective, in such a way that, subjected to the test of time (two or three years), they could settle into place and be presented with greater calmness for popular approval. This procedure would mean a guarantee of solidity and sufficiency of the agreements reached. At the same time, the process would have to close with an undertaking of loyal and lastingdurable adherenceadhesion on the part of the pParties involved, in such a manner that what was agreed would receive sufficient guarantees of stability and permanency.

4. Procedural Matters

a) Before the opening of the process, it would be necessary, clearly, to hold intense processes of dialogue in various directions, to ripenmature the proposal and to make it viable. Such processes of dialogue would require maximum discretion (how to achieve this?). The dialogues would have to involve: a) the pParties of the Discussion GroupTable; the central gGovernment and the opposition Parties active throughout Spainin the ambit of the State; c) the world of ETA and HB, for the purpose of sounding out and even encouraging their availability (here the secret contacts with ETA acquire sense and meaning). It would also require an intense process of information to the public opinion.

b) It would advisablebe fitting to have available a serious study on the legal framework of legality covering the process, in which an investigation would be held concerningaround the possibilities of the Constitution and the Statute (Additional Provision OneFirst and Sole Additional ProvisionUnique, respectively, as well as the repealing provisionDisposition and others). Not forgetting, however, that the direction of the whole process would have to be eminently political. On the basis of firmFrom a decided political will there could perhaps be a constitutional and Statute-based reading which would admitgive room to those such consensus as which might be reached.

c) After the proposal had been discussed and matured, it would have to be formulated and presented in an appropriate manner. It would have to be decided then :

- who presents it

- when and how to do it.

Conclusion

All the above is not, as can be clearly deduced, a formal proposal of dialogue addressed to ETA and HB. In the current state of things, it is simply a proposal for agreement addressed to the Pparties which make up the Table of Ajuria Enea Discussion Group. We are all aware that in the current circumstances the conditions are not right for addressing proposals of this type to the world of ETA-HB, especially . Even less so when there is not sufficient agreement among ourselves.

But, having made this clear, it is the same current circumstances are those which urge us to construct agreements over this whole matter. Basque society is not prepared to allowfor this problem to festerbe shut off indefinitely and to have to live with it without hope of solution.

The proposal which is made will raise, as is clear, many questions and, suspicions and much resistance. That is only natural. But the great question which is posedput and which we must answer is, if it will it serve to achieve peace?. If so, then all the troubles which it provokes will have been worthwhile the pain.

For the moment, however, another prior question faces us. If we, the democratic Parties, were to reach a solid agreement onaround a proposal of this type, would we not already have achieved, simply through this, the reinforcing of our unity and the recovery of the leadership in the process of pacification? Perhaps just for this it is worth the trouble to take taking it into consideration.

Because, once the final outcome ishorizon defined, it willwould be easier for us to judge the appropriateness or inappropriateness of all the other elements which make up the anti-terrorist fight and the process of pacification. This is not the moment to analyse all these elements one by one: elements such as police efficiency, legal action, prison policy, social pressure, political discourse to be held, the approach to or isolation of HB, contacts with ETA, etc. What must be stressedit is interesting to underline is that such elements will be correct or incorrect to the extent byin the measure in which they lead to that outcomethis horizon or divert us from it. This must be the criterion for putting them into practice and judging them. As a general criterion, anything whichall that contributes to making ETA and HB see the uselessness of continuingpersisting in the violence will be conducive to this outcomehorizon. What is dealt with in Tthis proposal aimsis precisely to persuade ETA and HB that the continuation of conflict is less useful, less comfortable and less profitable than its resolution.

And, to finish, one final consideration. In the process of pacification, as was conceived in the Ajuria Enea Agreement, the possibility of an "dialogue-based solutionend through dialogue" was always present. It was said at times, however, that the insistence on this possibility weakened the anti-terrorist fight and strengthened ("gave free reinwings to") the violent. This lead to the tendency to proscribe the term "dialogue" from the democratic language in the context of this fight, for fear of exposing a "weakness" in the system.

The approach suggestedsuggestion which has been made in these pages is based onstarts from a very different conviction. Dialogue, in addition to being an attribute of the democratic system which can never be given up, constitutes one of its maximum strengths. To insist on dialogue weakens one's own positions only when the conditions and contents are not specific and co-ordinatedcoordinated, that is to say, when it is given to understand that, through dialogue, anything is possible at any moment and under any circumstance. There can be no doubt that this error has been committed. But when the offer of dialogue comes accompanied by a clear definition of the terms on which it is possibleits conditions of possibility, its proceedings and its contents, in place of weakness it means strength. And That is, I believe, that the offer of the dialogue offered here meets those requirements.which is dealt with here. Under these conditions, to insist on the dialogue and to encourage it is always appropriate.

Appendix

Last Update: 10 - 06 - 1998
LEHENDAKARITZA